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Natural numbers, although they pervade much of mathematics,
are among the most difficult of entities forwhich to rovide
definitions. Although it is often overlooked, as the efforts
of pure mathematics are directed toward the maximization of rigor,
the development of sound definitions for numbers can be viewed
as one of the most critical objectives of the discipline.
This paper is an examination and a su ort for the efforts
in this area of the German logician Gottlob Frege, and in part-
icular of his landmark treatise Die Grundla en der Arithmetik.
This work marked the first succesful attem t to define numbers
through appeal to pure logic alone, and stands as a si nificant
achievement in the history of mathematical
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"It is surely a very remarkable thing that
despi te the range, power, and success of modern
mathematics, the concept of the natural number, on
which the whole edifice rests, is still something
of a mystery."
Friedrich Waissmann
Were we to be approached by a child, and asked to furnish a
defini tion for a number, we might do what is typically done in
such a circumstance, namely put pen to paper and make some sort
of a mark, such as "3" for example, and then utter "this is the
number three."
To a child, such an 'answer' to the inquiry might seem
entirely satisfactory, but is it really? If we were to then be
reminded that in associating the mark "3" with the phrase "the
number three" we have incorporated the definite article, by which
we would apparently wish to bestow upon the number three the
property of uniqueness, what then would we respond were the child
to stand next to a clock whose face bore Roman numerals, point to
"III," and consequently say "I thought that this was the number
three"? How could it be that the number three could be two
things which were so completely dissimilar?
Once such an objection were to be lodged, it would become
immediately clear to us what was wrong with the definition of the
number three which we had provided. The difficulty lies with the
fact that "3" and "III" are actually only numerals, or more
generally representations for the number three, and not really
the number three at all.
Recognizing our error, we are left once more where we began,
confronted with the problem of providing a definition for
a number. It is unfortunate, and even somewhat distressing, that .
there are few people who are then prepared to advance an
~ alternative to this definition for numbers, or who are even able
~ to identify what sort of an entity numbers might be.
What may be even more distressing is the fact that many
people will want to dismiss this disturbing situation as one
which is of little importance. They will suggest that to argue
the merit of a rigorous definition for numbers is merely to
quibble over an insignificant theoretical detail, and then
proceed to perform the various tasks involving applications of
the numbers, such as arithmetic, without pausing to give the
matter a second thought.
However, is it not, as the German logician Gottlob Frege
once said, a "scandal," that in a discipline such as mathematics,
a science whose obj ect is the attainment of absolute rigor, we
should encounter entities which are incontestably among the most
primitive in the study and yet for which we find it impossible to
provide even a semblance of an adequate definition? And if it
should turn out that we are unable to define numbers, how in the
world are we ever to justify our usage of them in increasingly
elaborate mathematical equations?
Could we ever feel secure that the entire structure of
mathematics, erected as it is upon the foundation of numbers, is
not fundamentally flawed and fallacious? Might it not then be
that, when all has been said and done, we shall find mathematics
to be nothing more than deft manipulation of empty symbols?
Certainly, it would appear to be well worth the while for us
.
to more intently scrutinize the concept of numbers, so that we
might provide the adequate definitions which will ensure the
~ preservation of mathematical rigor.
But how shall we go about defining the numbers? Since they
comprise an infinite set, it is immediately clear that to define
them by enumeration would be a task which we would have no hope
of completing, and since we have already dispelled the notion
that we can define them simply through the use of numerals, we
would seem to have run out of clear cut places to begin.
Defining the concept of number in general, and the
individual numbers in particular, is a problem which has been the
object of much philosophic study historically, and is one whose
origins can be traced back to the time of the great geometer and
philosopher Pythagoras of Samos. Let us examine some of the more
prominent views which have arisen on this topic, see why each in
turn must be dismissed as being inadequate for our purposes, and
come at last to the correct solution.
One suggestion has been that there is much that we could
learn from our common usage of the number names (such as one,
two, three, etcetera) in our quest for defining the numbers. An
example of this is, as we have already seen, the fact that, when
speaking of numbers, we employ the definite article, an act which
would seem to indicate that we view the numbers as possessing the
quality of uniqueness. Let us pursue this line of thought a bit
further, and see if there is more information which such an
analysis can reveal.
Moritz Cantor, a nineteenth century German philosopher and
mathematician, observed the grammatical occurrence of the
o numbers, and noticed that, when we employ the various number
names in context, it is typically in the manner of attributive
adjectives that we do so.
If one were to consider the following pair of sentences, for
example:
These are two roses.
These are red roses.
it would appear at first glance as though our usage of the words
"red" and "two" in these sentences is in some way similar. It
was this similarity which Cantor observed, and which led him to
suggest that numbers are (in their essence) properties which are
held by objects, and that it was as properties that numbers
should be defined.
r In the sentences above, for example, Cantor would say that
there is a property of number, twoness, we might call it, which
the roses possess, just as they possess a property of color,
which we might call redness.
However, in spite of the similarity of appearance of the
aforementioned sentences, there is a rather significant
difference between what is being expressed by each, a difference
which is worthy of greater attention.
If we can say that the roses which we observe are red in
color, and we then regard each of the roses in turn, it will be
the case that each is individually red in color. The property
of redness, we would agree, not only belongs to the agglomeration .
.
of roses, but also to the individual roses. It makes perfect
~ sense for us to say: These are red roses, therefore each of the
roses has the property of redness.
It is immediately apparent that it is not possible for us to
do the same sort of thing with regard to the alleged property of
twoness. If we were to attempt to do so, we would wind up with:
These are two roses, therefore each of the roses has the property
of twoness. This is clearly not what one would have liked to
happen. If there were any number property which one would have
associated with the individual roses, surely it would have (if
anything) been "onenes s." That would seem to go hand in hand
with their being perceived as "individual" roses.
Yet it is not easy to see why we should be able to perform
such an analysis with the property of color and yet be unable to
do so with number, if indeed it really is the case that they are
both properties in the same sense.
But let us not be so easily daunted in our attempt to define
numbers as properties of physical objects; it may well be that
numbers really are properties of physical objects, and that it is
some sort of grammatical oddity which hinders our ability to
perform the transformation which failed a moment ago.
The view that numbers can be defined as properties of
objects is one which was also held by the noted philosopher John
stuart Mill, who said that numbers could be defined through a
process of abstraction from an "observed matter of fact."
"A number," Mill claimed, "can be viewed as synonymous with
the agglomeration of things by which we call the name, and is to
be given (to the agglomeration) according to the characteristic
manner in which the agglomeration is made up." By "the
agglomeration of things by which we call the name," Mill would be
referring, in our example, to the roses.
However, before we fully embrace this solution, let us
consider in somewhat greater depth Mill's suggestion. In order
to abstract a number from the physical condition of the roses in
our sight, it is first necessary that we should determine the
characteristic manner in which the agglomeration is constructed.
It is here that the first difficulty is encountered with Mill's
suggestion for defining numbers: what is the characteristic
manner in which this agglomeration is made up?
One might say that it is as two roses, and therefore the
number corresponding to the agglomeration should be two. But
~ what if we view the agglomeration not as two roses, but as ten
petals? And why not as one pair of flowers? This is a
formidable problem for Mill to resolve, and his entire theory for
defining numbers hangs in the balance depending upon the choice.
what has gone wrong in this case is that the characteristic
manner in which we view an obj ect, in this case the roses, has
become a victim of perspective. That the roses are, in fact, red
(if that is indeed the case) is by virtue of their surfaces being
such that they reflect a certain wavelength of light. This is a
condition which endures in spite of any manner in which we should
choose to view the roses; it is independent of our point of view.
That the roses possess the quality of twoness depends
entirely upon our manner of looking at them. As we have seen, it
~. is quite clearly the case that there are many different numbers
which we could ascribe to the physical condition of the roses.
Herein lies the difference between the numbers and the properties
which can be made predicates of objects.
We might try to avoid this problem by attempting to abstract
numbers not from any object which we should come across, but
rather restrict our efforts to those things which we can perceive
as being indivisible. An effort to do so was made by Baumann and
Kopp, in their attempt to salvage Mill's theory that numbers
could be defined in terms of physicality.
However, in such an attempt, it would be difficult to find
objects which one could truthfully judge to be indivisible, and
thereby employ in defining numbers. On inspection, it would seem
that it is always the case that we can argue a given object could
be dissected into the sum of parts, and thereby considered not as
a single object but as a plurality.
It may well be that Baumann and Kopp wished that we should
merely accept certain things as being indivisibles, and not
attempt to disintegrate them into components. Such an insistence
is, of course, entirely unsatisfactory, however, as it is our
intent that the definitions of numbers be ones which may be
relied upon as being rigorously truthful, and we can only expect
that we would be led astray by accepting at the outset premises
known to be untrue.
But apart from these criticisms, let us consider an
objection to Mill which is far more serious. If we were to
r accept that numbers can only be defined based upon abstraction
from conditions of physicality, what are we to make of a number
of substantial size, say, an octillion?
A number such as this must pose such a view a grave problem,
indeed, for if it is true, as Mill wrote, that numbers are to be
defined only from an "observed matter of fact," how shall we ever
extract an octillion from our surroundings? And if we should
find, in the end, that we are incapable of doing so, how shall we
ever manage to define an octillion?
One might suggest that Mill, in putting forward his claim,
was speaking only of the comparatively 'small' numbers, and by
this I mean those with which one can readily associate groups of
objects lying close at hand, say the numbers one through ten. But
if this is the case, what justification can be given for choosing
ten as the largest number which may be so defined, and not
eleven? And if eleven, why not twelve? For such a question Mill
can not possibly provide an answer, for there is no manner in
which such a choice could be justified.
Finally, and by far the most damaging to the perspective
that numbers are things which we can define as properties which
we abstract from that which is physical, consider the undeniable
truth that there are many things which we should like to count
which have no physical form whatsoever.
If it is the case that the number three, for instance, is
something which we abstract from the physical condition of, say,
three pencils lying on a table top, how are we to explain our
ability to speak of three ideas? Three spoken words? Three
abili ties? All of these things are not physical, yet we should
want our account of numbers to allow for them nonetheless. Were
Mill's view to be correct, it would, in fact, be incorrect to
speak of anything which was not physical as having any sort of
number associated with it.
Let us, therefore, dismiss the notion that numbers may be
defined as being properties of that which is physical, and turn
to the other significant historical point of view on the problem
of defining number. This view is one which may be judged to be
the extreme opposite of the preceding point of view, as the
contention here is that number is not to be defined in a manner
which is in the least physical, but rather as an idea.
Gottfried von Leibniz was among the leading figures who
rejected the view that number was something which could be
defined through an abstraction from the physical world. Quite on
the contrary, it was his contention that the definitions of the
numbers had nothing whatever to do with physical objects, but
rather were definable only as something which was entirely
subjective.
This was a view which was also held by George Berkeley, who
claimed that "number is nothing which can be fixed and settled,
(drawn from) things themselves. It is entirely a creature of the
mind, considering, either an idea by itself, or any combination
of ideas to which it gives one name."
This point of view would seem to have a number of immediate
No longer would there be a single number two, for example.
Rather, at any given time, there would be well over four billion
number twos in the world, one for each person, and there would be
~ advantages over that which was proposed by Mill and his
followers, and we might at first think that we have corne upon the
solution to the problem. For one thing, in accepting such a view
we would seem to have regained our ability to place with those
things which are "number-able" all of the non-material things
which we had lost when we had attempted to define numbers as
properties of objects. Also, it would appear that the lack of
certainty which we discovered to be present regarding the number,
stemming from the problem of shifting perspective would vanish if
it were up to us to mentally define the numbers.
However, in achieving these gains, it will be seen that we
must pay a high price indeed. Recall our earlier insistence that
(as our usage of the number names would indicate) the numbers
themselves be unique. If we allow that the numbers can only be
defined subjectively, varying necessarily from individual to
individual, it would seem that this quality of numbers would be
undone.
no way in which we could ever be certain that any of them were
the same. If I were to mention the number two in conversation,
whose two would I mean? Mine? Yours? How are we ever to know
if we are speaking of the same two?
.
And what then would we make of knowledge which has been
.
passed down through history? Could we possibly have any reason
for believing that Newton was referring to our two when he
employed the symbol ·2' in his calculations? That Newton's two
and our two might happen to agree with respect to some of their
properties and applications would be no guarantee that they were
one and the same.
The answer to the question posed above is, of course, no.
As is the case with all forms of communication, without mutual
understanding there can be no exchange of information, and as a
result, were we to accept that numbers are something which can
only be defined subjectively, mathematics must grind to a halt.
This is the price which we incur for accepting Leibniz's
alternative to Mill's point of view.
And, as if this weren' t enough, consider now the problem
which arises from the fact that the numbers form an infinite set
(there is no such thing as a largest number). Within our finite
minds, how are we ever to come to grasp an infinite set? And if
we can possess knowledge of only finitely many numbers, is it
nonsensical to speak of extremely large numbers, those which we
can not define intuitively?
Clearly, to accept the proposition that the numbers may be
defined as being entirely subjective entities is to step upon a
slippery slope indeed. In so doing, we seem to make inevitable
the collapse of much of mathematics, and make impossible the
communication of mathematical ideas.
Now, before proceeding to introduce that view which I
consider to be the solution to the problem of defining numbers,
~let us pause to recapitulate what we have deduced to this point.
It is, as we have seen, not possible to define numbers as
properties abstracted from physical objects, as Mill and his
followers mistakenly believed, just as it is not possible for us
to attempt to define the numbers subjectively, calling upon
intuition, as Leibniz and Berkeley sought to do.
Perhaps the way to move beyond these views is to ask what it
is that is flawed with each position. While it seemed at first
that each manner of defining the numbers had a measure of
promise, what was it about those views which allowed us to so
easily discount them?
The first to recognize and exhibit what was happening in
each case was Frege, in his landmark treatise Die Grundlagen der
r-' Arithmetik, which was devoted to resolving precisely the problem
which has been taken up here. It was Frege's contention that in
each of the previous suggestions for defining numbers there was
at work a vicious underlying circularity of definition, and that
this circularity was the center of the difficulty which was
preventing the discovery of number definitions.
Consider for a moment the manner in which Leibniz would have
us define numbers, that is to say, subj ecti vely. He would say
that (in some manner) the notion of number is one which is
intuitive, and is in a sense a priori. We all, according to
Leibniz, possess an innate understanding of the numbers.
But how do we corne to view (in our mind's eye) something as
having a certain number of members or elements? If our knowledge
~
of number is subjective, it would seem that some mental process
must be at work which allows us to understand the individual
numbers and to associate them with collections of entities.
If someone were to ask us to visualize a set with two
entities, such as the much belabored example of the roses, this
would not seem to be a difficult thing to do. However, having
done this, what if we were then to be asked, how do you know that
you have two roses in your set?
The answer which leaps to mind is, naturally, that we think
of the roses, mentally count up how many there are, and that is
the number which we have (two, in this case). But now we have
placed ourselves in a somewhat uncomfortable position, as the
process of counting is one which presupposes for its
r meaningfulness that we have in our hands firm knowledge and
defini tions of the numbers. When we count, what we do is to
establish the existence of a one to one relationship between the
numbers (1,2,..., n) and the elements of a set having n members.
It remains to define what the numbers (1,2,...,n) in fact are.
A moment's consideration reveals this condition to exist in
Mill's proposal, as well. This would seem to explain (at least
partly) what might have been wrong with the preceding points of
view toward defining the numbers. If we are to hold any hope at
all of providing definitions of the numbers, therefore, we must
find some way of speaking about them without falling back
unconsciously upon the principle of counting.
Let us recall one of the problems which we encountered with
~.
regard to the pair of roses, specifically how we found that the
number with which the roses were to be associated changed as we
altered the way in which we chose to look at the roses. Our
situation might be improved if we could develop an understanding
as to why this carne about.
We had noted that the property of redness belonged not only
to the pair of roses, but to the individual roses as well, and
our inability to say the same with regard to twoness was part of
our motivation for discarding the notion that number was a
property in the manner of color.
Frege considered this situation, and carne to the following
conclusion: when we say that the number to be associated with
the roses is two, it is because we include in the statement the
r- term' roses.' On the other hand, when we look at the roses and
determine that the number to be associated with these objects
is ten, it is because we have included in the statement the term
'petals. I It is in the absence of these additional terms that we
encounter uncertainty with regard to the number to be associated
with the roses.
Thus the reason that the number of the roses changed was due
to the fact that we altered our way of looking at them through
the introduction of these other terms. Because we were able to
do so, it would seem reasonable to conclude that the number does
not, as Mill and Cantor had believed, belong to the roses at all,
either individually or as an agglomeration. Rather, we would
expect the number to have more to do with the terms which
f' affected our way of viewing the roses.
This, said Frege, is at the root of the difficulty. Our
problems in providing a definition of number originate in our
intui tive tendency to attribute the number to the wrong entity,
and it will only be after we have "returned number to its
rightful owner" that we will be able to begin to make headway in
any attempt to define the numbers.
To what, then, does the number rightfully belong? In
looking at the example of the roses, we saw that the number two,
for instance, is derived when we consider the pair of roses,
and consider the quantity of roses which are present. The number
ten, on the other hand, comes to us when we consider the quantity
of petals which are present. Similarly, the number one comes to
us when we consider the quantity of flower pairs which are
present.
Each of these notions (quantity of roses present, quantity
of rose petals present, and quantity of flower pairs) Frege
described as concepts, and it is these concepts to which any
statement of number must belong. If we include in our
contemplation of the roses the concept 'quantity of petals,' we
find that the number with which we associate the concept is ten;
this judgement is not subject to the variance of perspective, it
merely is or is not the case.
Bertrand Russell, in his analysis of Frege' s Grundlagen,
considered the role of concepts in determining numbers at greater
length, and carne to the conclusion that, when we consider, for
example, the roses, we may say that the quantity of roses which
we have are an instance of the number two, which is then an
instance of number. What is not the case is that the roses
rather to sets of objects together with their distinguishing
concepts, and that trait is precisely the feature that each set
possesses the same quantity of members.
members) by associating a number with each collection. In so
doing, we would manage to define numbers in a non-circular
manner, and our task will have been completed.
In his Grundlagen, Frege proposed that the manner in which
themselves are an instance of number, and it is here that Mill
and Cantor were led astray.
The number two, Russell said, is independent of physicality,
and is rather something which the concept "quantity of roses" has
in common with all other pairs of entities which we may care to
consider, and which distinguishes pairs from all other types of
sets, such as trios and quartets.
Thus a statement of number is revealed as something which is
objective, a trait belonging not to individual objects, but
r
The problem, now that we have restored numbers to their
rightful possessors, was, as Frege saw it, how we might determine
that two sets possess an equal quantity of members, not once
relying upon the principle of counting to do so. If this could
be done, it would be possible to define numbers according to
these collections of sets (all of which have an equal quantity of
this circularity could be avoided was by invoking a concept which
we might have no idea what the number of the cups and saucers
actually was, for the cups and saucers would stand in a one to
one correspondence with one another.
will be familiar to those who have dabbled in mathematics and
logic, the one to one correspondence.
Let us digress for a moment from the task at hand, and
expand upon this notion for the benefit of the uninitiated, in
order that the utility of the concept may come to light. If we
were to come across a collection of cups and saucers lying upon a
table before us, so arranged that beneath every cup there was a
saucer, and that upon every saucer stood a cup, we could say,
without worry, that we were in the presence of an equal quantity
of cups and saucers. We could say so in spite of the fact that
The way in which Frege referred to such a condition was to
say that the set of cups and the set of saucers were
equinumerous. Using this terminology, we can say that all sets
which are equinumerous share the property of having the same
quantity of members, and hence number will be the one
characteristic common to equinumerous sets.
what we need in order to progress to the definitions of the
individual numbers, then, is the introduction of what we may
describe as characteristic sets, sets against which any other set
may be compared. With each characteristic set A we will
associate a number a, and then any set which is found to be
equinumerous with A will, by definition, have a members.
As Frege pointed out, the assignment of number-names to the
various characteristic sets is an act which is purely arbitrary.
We shall, for convenience sake, make our assignment of
number-names in such a manner that their familiar usage will not
be impaired.
Consider the set A, whose membership is defined by agreement
with the concept "not identical with oneself." That is, let
A = ( x : x is not identical with x )
As every obj ect possesses the quality of self -identi ty, it is
immediately apparent that the set A possesses no members. If we
then choose to assign the number 0 to the concept "not equal with
oneself," then every set found to be equinumerous with the set A
will, by definition, be said to have 0 members.
Of course, any set having no members would have served
~.
equally as well for the characteristic set of the number 0, which
is evident from the fact that every set which has no members is
equinumerous with A.
Following the definition given for the number 0, we proceed
immediately to the number one: let B be the set given by
B = ( x : x is identical with 0 )
Clearly, (since, as we have already pointed out, every object is
identical with itself) 0 is in this set, but the set contains
nothing else. This follows since nothing satisfies the condition
of being both identical with zero and yet not identical with
zero, and therefore the only member of the set B is O. We then
define any set which is equinumerous with the set B to have 1
member.
In principle, this process of defining characteristic sets
then proceeds ad infinitum, defining next the characteristic set
of two as
C = x,y: x is identical with 0, y identical with 1
whose only members are 0 and 1, and so on. Clearly, as we are
adopting the practice of associating the familiar arabic numeral
representative with each characteristic set, the characteristic
set with which the number n shall be associated will be given by:
N = ( 0, 1, ... , n-1 ).
Now, as the numbers have it in their nature to be arranged
in a typical ordering, what is necessary at this point is to
show that we can define the relationship which each number bears
to the number which precedes it. Although it is beyond the
(~ scope of this effort to demonstrate, from this relationship
it will be possible to develop the familiar Peano postulates,
with which one can construct the arithmetic properties which we
commonly associate with the numbers, and thereby give further
justification for acceptance of the Fregean definitions.
To introduce this method for ordering the numbers, all
that we need do is to generalize a relationship which our
definition of a given number bears to that of its predecessor,
and use that relationship as the criterion for succession. It
will be immediately apparent that, owing to the manner in which
the numbers have been defined, the statement
There is a concept F and an object x falling under F such
that the number (as defined) which applies to the concept F is n,
and the number which applies to the concept "falling under F but
not identical with x" is m
is such a generalization, and so can be taken as synonymous with
the statement
n immediately follows m in the series of natural numbers
That this is so can be seen if we consider an example of the
numbers as they have been defined. In the case of the number
one, the general concept F is "equal to zero," the object x
falling under F is a itself, the number n applying to the concept
F is 1, and the number applying to the concept "falling under F
but not identical with x" is O. Thus 1 immediately follows a in
the series of natural numbers, by definition.
Having completed the definitions of the individual numbers,
f' which was our goal from the outset, let us examine the
superiority of this suggestion over those which have been
previously given. In so doing, we shall justify the claim that
the offered definition truly is an improvement over those which
we might have accepted before, and be confident that we have
overcome those shortcomings which caused us to dismiss those
views as incorrect.
First of all, in the view of Mill, our definitions of the
numbers had required the observation of a "matter of fact," and
then a consideration of the characteristic manner in which the
agglomeration comprising that observed matter was made up. We
have revealed the weaknesses of such a contention, and now point
out that the Fregean definitions require no actual, observed,
octillion. with the requirement that numbers be defined by
abstraction from an observed matter of fact, our ability to
define such large numbers was cast into great doubt.
.~. matter of fact for their validity.
The importance of this improvement is especially noticeable
when we consider how the definitions as given by Mill faltered
when considering numbers of substantial size, such as an
However, now that we have freed ourselves from the
encumbrance of physicality by associating numbers with
characteristic sets, we need not have any concern over whether or
not there are actual sets consisting of an octillion members,
other than the characteristic set of an octillion which would be
(in theory) generated by our process of definition. It is enough
~. that we maintain that any set which could be placed into a one to
one correspondence with the characteristic set of an octillion
would, by definition, be said to contain an octillion members.
Also, the obstacles which arose from the necessity of
observing objects in their characteristic manner have been
overcome by defining the numbers through the use of sets, whose
membership is determined by agreement with specified traits. Each
member of the set is then considered as one entity falling under
the specifying trait of the set, which removes the possibility of
considering individual entities as a plurality.
When we had looked at the offering of Leibniz and Berkeley,
we had discovered that their contention (that numbers could only
be defined subjectively) destroyed the notion that numbers were
unique objects of study, made impossible the communication of
mathematical ideas, and called for the containment of an infinite
set of numbers within our all-too-finite minds.
From the Fregean point of view, we find that numbers have
again had their obj ecti ve certainty restored. The principle of
equinumerosi ty which is called upon in defining the numbers is
one which assures us of unanimous accord when speaking of the
numbers, as the characteristic sets by which the numbers have
been def ined are the same for everyone. As a consequence, when
someone is heard to utter "These are two roses, IIfor example, it
is only with the characteristic set (0,1) that the number two is
affiliated, and thus there is no room for misunderstanding. Hence
the ambiguity which had existed with Leibniz's subjective view is
~. eliminated.
By defining numbers through the use of characteristic sets
which stand apart from individuals we have also restored
communicability to mathematical ideas, for much the same reasons
as those which were just described. When I use the number two,
for example, in calculation, there is no longer the worry that
the two which I employ might not be the same as that of someone
else, as the objectivity of the definitions ensures our
agreement.
Finally, since the definitions of the numbers have been
established as objective constructions exterior to our minds, the
problem which arose from attempting to confine the infinite set
of numbers within our finite minds is avoided entirely.
Thus, having demonstrated that the Fregean definitions for
numbers, based as they are upon the notion of one to one
correspondence with characteristic sets, are not subject to the
criticisms which caused us to reject those views which were
given previously, and having shown that by so defining the
numbers we find agreement with the familiar qualities of numbers,
we can feel confident that our definitions for the numbers are
satisfactory.
We recall that one of the motivations for seeking an
adequate definition for the numbers was the assurance of a solid
foundation for the theoretical structure of mathematics. As our
definitions for the numbers are based upon the simple logical
relation of the one to one correspondence and the familiar notion
r of a set, we have established a certainty for our knowledge of
the numbers which originates from the truths of logic, and stands
apart from intuition. Consequently, the uncertainty which was
present when we began our efforts has been overcome, and hence
the rigor of mathematics as based upon the numbers assured.
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